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The ‘end’ of social democracy has been pronounced repeatedly, with varying degrees of 
conviction in recent decades (Dahrendorf 1990; Giddens 1994; Gray 1996, 1998). Meanwhile, 
in 2007, both the French and Italian left have entered (yet another) phase of introspection, 
ideological redefinition and aggiornamiento. In both cases, the path of social democratisation 
is seen (by at least one major faction) as virtually synonymous with modernity and ‘renewal’. 
This attests to the capacity for ideological innovation, and renovation, within social 
democracy.  
 
How could so many erudite scholars pronouncing the death of social democracy so assertively 
over the last two decades ago have been so mistaken? The answer lies in how social 
democracy is conceived, and some hidden assumptions within these commentaries on the 
fortunes of the left in the late twentieth and early 21st Century. There is a tendency to identify 
social democracy firstly with a particular set of institutional ‘means’ (such as corporatism or 
nationalisation) and secondly with the policy paradigms within which those means were 
couched (such as ‘planning’ or ‘Keynesianism’).  The fortunes of social democracy are 
evaluated in terms of particular means through which, across the twentieth century in different 
national contexts, the political aspirations of social democracy have been channelled. This 
leads to detailed analysis of particular national configurations of institutions, policies and 
paradigms. These means-oriented approaches have generated much invaluable insight into the 
nature of social democracy and its historical, political and programmatic development. 
However, the lessons to draw from this means based analysis of social democracy are not 
those which first leap off the page.  
 
There is an elision within some of this analysis, assuming that because the political claims of 
social democracy were advanced through a particular set of policies or institutions, therefore 
social democracy is ultimately reducible to those elements. It ‘follows’ that the continuing 
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viability of these institutions or policy approaches is a necessary condition if the enduring 
viability of social democracy. When the ideational and institutional conditions changed, 
eroding or undermining the coherence of social democratic programmatic settlements rooted 
in those ideas, institutions, and policies, this was diagnosed as terminal for social democracy 
as a political movement.  
 
Yet this excessively static, indeed ahistorical conception misconstrues the relation between 
social democracy’s programmatic goals and the means deployed in pursuit of social 
democratic ends. Fundamentally, it misunderstands the nature of social democracy and 
prematurely discounts its capacity for renewal (see Clift 2003). This focus on means, almost 
to the exclusion of ends, explains the confidence in assigning social democracy to the rubbish 
bin of history. Nationalisation, planning, ‘modernisation’ and the Keynesian welfare state 
project coalesced into but one ‘strategic amalgam’1 through which to pursue the politics of 
social democracy. That all elements of this approach no longer retain the same relevance 
should not surprise us. Nor should it lead us to write off social democracy as a spent force. 
Rather, the changed international economic and domestic political context requires us to look 
how social democratic goals are pursued today, and seek to trace the outline of a new 
‘strategic amalgam’ – or amalgams.  
 
The much missed Paul Hirst offered an ends-oriented definition of social democracy which 
identifies its core elements, ‘minimising the cost of capitalism for individuals, either through 
growth and employment enhancing policies, and/or, through welfare state provision for the 
contingencies of unemployment, ill-health and old age’. Secondly, it ‘attempts to tackle and 
reduce major and unjustifiable inequalities in power and wealth,’ and thirdly it seeks to 
‘accomplish these objectives within the limits set by parliamentary democracy on the one 
hand, and private property and the market economy on the other’ (1999: 87).  This ends 
oriented approach to social democracy does not tie itself to a particular set of ‘corporatist’ 
structures, but emphasises agency. It is both less static and also more conducive to the 
comparative analysis of social democracy. Restrictive definitions in terms of particular 
‘means’ are prone to ‘Swedocentrism’, 2 which roots the definition of social democracy in the 
                                                 
1 See C. Pierson Socialism After Communism (Cambridge ; Polity 1995), p. 34. 
2 The term is borrowed from H. Keman ‘Theoretical Approaches to Social Democracy’ Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 5/3 (1993), pp. 291-316. Many analyses of the relationship between globalization and social democracy 
emphasise ‘encompassing’ labour movements in facilitating social democratic response to adverse international 
economic conditions, see for example G. Garrett, Partisan Politics in a Global Economy. However, these 
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corporatist institutions characteristic of ‘Northern’ social democracy.3 Focusing on ends 
facilitates comparative analysis of cases where particular institutional means deemed core to 
social democracy – such as corporatist bargaining institutions – do not exist in the prescribed 
form (such as France), or have diminished in import over time (such as the UK). 
 
The ends – securing equality of outcome and opportunity, redistribution to the most needy in 
society, and facilitating the widest possible access to employment within society – can, in the 
broadest terms, be summarized as the attempt to reconcile social justice to economic 
efficiency. These ends have remained the same across time. The means, however, have 
evolved significantly.  
 
Full Employment, Keynesianism …. and New Labour  
 
The importance of full employment as a core aim of social democracy, essential to social 
democrats making their peace with the capitalist economy should be underlined; 
As long as capitalist crises could happen at any moment, whatever gains unions and 
social democratic parties might have achieved in the redistribution of incomes or the 
expansion of public services must have seemed extremely insecure. Indeed, the unions 
had been helpless during the Great Depression of the early 1930s, as the welfare state 
collapsed under the burden of mass unemployment. Social democrats could thus make 
their reluctant peace with capitalism only if they could also hope to avoid its recurrent 
crises or at least to dampen them sufficiently to assure the continuous economic 
growth that was necessary to maintain full employment and the expansion of public 
services. (Scharpf 1991: 23) 
 
This is one of the reasons why the policy paradigm of Keynesianism has been identified so 
closely with social democracy (see Przeworski 1985). Its role as a legitimating discourse was 
crucial to social democrats’ perceived ‘fitness to govern’, justifying state intervention in the 
economy in a socially just direction in terms of economic efficiency. Keynesianism laid down 
a blueprint of how the economic regulatory potentialities of the nation state could be tailored 
to secure social democratic goal of full employment. 
                                                                                                                                                        
analyses offer little insight into social democracy in national contexts where such institutions are inherently weak 
and on the wane (e.g. Britain) or never existed in the prescribed form (e.g. France). It is in no small part the need 
to plug this gap in the literature which has inspired the choice of the Labour Party and the Parti Socialiste for 
consideration here.  
3 So dominant are the northern, and particularly Scandinavian social democracies within the literature that one 
study which claimed to be a comprehensive analysis of the entire social democratic dataset made no mention of 
France or any of the ‘southern’ social democratic movements. J. Pontusson ‘Explaining the Decline of European 
Social Democracy: The Role of Structural Economic Change’,  World Politics 47 (July 1995). 
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 There are problems of diagnosis and prognosis with how the Keynesian policy paradigm is 
understood within the means-based examination of the health of social democracy. The 
characterisation of Keynesianism (like social democracy more broadly) is often static, 
generalising too widely (across time and space) from a particular historical contingent 
articulation of Keynesianism and social democracy. Sometimes, these accounts place 
emphasis on the wrong elements within the Keynesian referential. For example, John Gray, 
for example, unhelpfully (mis)defines social democracy as ‘the combination of deficit-
financed full employment, a comprehensive welfare state and egalitarian tax policies that 
existed in Britain until the late 1970s and which survived in Sweden until the early 1990s.’ 
This grossly over-states the importance of deficit financing to social democracy.4  
 
More importantly, insufficient attention is paid to how policy paradigms can evolve over time, 
and how Keynesian insights may render different policy solutions in different contexts. This 
is particularly ironic in relation to Keynesianism, since than man himself was forever revising 
his economic prognoses in the light of changing political circumstances. His was not a single 
unchanging doctrine from which one set of consistent policy prescriptions emerged. As 
Winch notes of Keynes’ moving position on the question of revenue tariffs in 1930-1, Keynes 
‘was the first to admit the irrelevance of the revenue tariff after the abandonment of the gold 
standard … Keynes was driven out of the free trade camp by his responsiveness to the 
pressure of immediate policy circumstances.’5 In Leijonhufvud’s assessment, Keynes’ policy 
writing showed a great ability and readiness to adapt to changing political and economic 
circumstances, and ‘Keynes’ judgements of what was politically feasible at the time … 
coloured his writings to an extent that more academically oriented economists have not 
always fully appreciated.’6 Within social democracy debates, by contrast, Keynesian is often 
presented as an unchanging set of tenets. 
 
It has become something of a conventional wisdom that we have witnessed the demise of 
Keynesianism since the 1970s, and with it comes the ‘end’ of social democracy. Yet the 
                                                 
4 Gray, False Dawn, p88 emphasis added.  Notermans goes so far as to argue the ‘irrelevance of Keynesianism’ 
to ‘golden age’ social democracy, which was due to sustained growth and the ability to contain inflation, not 
deficit financing. ‘Even in Keynes native Britain, deficit spending was absent and fiscal policy mainly exerted a 
contractive influence on consumption.’ T. Notermans Money, Markets and the State: Social Democratic 
Economic Policies Since 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), p. 163.  
5 Donald Winch, Economics and Policy, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969), p. 151 
6 Axel Leijonhufvud, On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1968), pp. 19-20, see also pp. 401-417. 
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widely held view that Keynesianism has been exhausted is inaccurate. At the level of political 
economic ideas, Keynesian political economy has not been wholly de-legitimised by the crisis 
of the 1970s. The relationship to New Right political economy is at times misconceived. The 
victory of monetarism over Keynesianism was not total, as the rise of various strands of New 
Keynesian economic thinking demonstrates.  
 
Furthermore, at the level of governmental practice, there are grounds to question the ‘end’ of 
Keynesianism thesis. On closer inspection, the evolving relation between Keynesian political 
economic ideas and social democracy in Britain is more complex, and more interesting. 
Firstly, Old labour's Keynesianism has been exaggerated.  Many of Labour's arguments in the 
1960s were based on asserting the limits of Keynesianism (because of the focus on 
'modernization'). In addition, the Keynesian use of the budget to influence unemployment was 
in practice heavily qualified by the focus on the balance of payments, so unemployment 
moved noticeably upwards from 1968/9.7 The Labour government of the 1970s was in 
general disposition the most Keynesian of the post-war Labour governments, but almost from 
the beginning (and long before the 1976 IMF visit) it was eschewing Keynesian policies in the 
face of the inflation and budget problems. Contrary to popular mythology, it was ironically 
only after the 1976 IMF stamp of approval was given to its policies, and credibility had been 
restored, that it was able to pursue a mild Keynesian expansion.8   
 
Moreover, the relation between New Labour and Keynesianism is closer than often 
recognised, as Gordon Brown underlined in the Economic Journal (Brown 2001). Although 
New Labour has explicitly renounced the ‘fine tuning’ often (somewhat problematically) 
associated with post-war Keynesian political economy, they have carved out policy space in 
which to engage in macroeconomic ‘coarse tuning’ inspired by Keynesian thinking. 
Macroeconomic policy activism, and in particular fiscal policy activism, remains a viable 
strategy and a prevalent feature of government economic policy. Recent research has argued 
that, in pursuit of full employment, an economic strategy of a broadly Keynesian character 
has been pursued in Britain since 1997 (Clift & Tomlinson 2007). At the level of economic 
                                                 
7 G. O’Hara, ‘Dynamic, Exciting, Thrilling Change: the Wilson Government’s Economic Policies. 1964-1970’  
Contemporary British History 20 (2006), pp. 383-402. 
8 Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, ‘Goodbye Great Britain’: the 1976 IMF crisis, (London: Yale University 
Press, 1992); Jim Tomlinson, ‘Economic Policy’ in Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson, eds, Old Labour, New 
Labour: the Wilson and Callaghan governments, 1974-79, (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 55-69. 
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doctrine, as well as at the level of policy practice, the enduring relevance of Keynesian 
macroeconomic thinking to policy is evident. 
 
Social democracy and globalisation  
 
References to the exhaustion of the Keynesian political economic paradigm, and to the 
decisive renunciation of Keynesianism (and indeed the commitment to full employment) are a 
familiar refrain of many authoritative works in comparative and international political 
economy. These are usually placed in the context of the breakdown of ‘embedded liberalism’ 
internationally,9 and of the rise of the New Right and monetarism ideologically.10 The 
supposed repudiation of Keynesianism is often ‘explained’ by a changing international 
political economic context with which Keynesian economic policies are deemed decreasingly 
compatible.11 Gray’s pessimistic account infers from the assumed centrality of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy to ‘credibility’, and the changing cost/benefit analysis of national economic 
policies, that ‘global mobility of capital and production in a world of open economies have 
made the central policies of European social democracy unworkable’.12 Hall charts the 
‘collapse of the Keynesian consensus’ (on the Left as well as the Right) in Britain, and the 
monetarist ‘triumph’, in particular within the Conservative Party and the City.13 He quotes 
Callaghan’s famous 1976 conference speech as ‘the obituary for Keynesianism in Britain’.14 
Globalisation is the usual suspect accused of the murder of Keynesianism, and the accusing 
barrister calls as witnesses the 1976 IMF crisis in Britain. As we have seen, the evidence that 
witness provides is at best ambiguous. 
 
New Labour’s own discourse of globalisation has often pandered to this line of argument. 
Held characterises New Labour as ‘hyper-globalist’, placing emphasis on ‘the overarching 
nature of global capitalism, on the inescapability of global competition, on standards of global 
economic efficiency and on the weakening capacity of states to regulate their economies …  
New Labour’s globalization policy package suggests that globalization is a fixed force which 
                                                 
9 Eric Helleiner, States and the Re-Emergence of Global Finance, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 
144-5. 
10 Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 126 & 139-151. 
11 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 16-7; John Gray, False Dawn (London: 
Granta, 1998). 
12 Gray, False Dawn, pp. 88-9. 
13 Peter Hall, Governing the Economy, (Cambridge: Pokity, 1986), pp. 92-9, 128-130 
14 Hall, Governing the Economy, p. 95. 
 6
has in general to be adapted to.’15 There is, Held argues, ‘a tendency to restrict the meaning of 
political prudence to the pursuit of a particular economic logic.’16 In a bid to bolster 
credibility with international financial markets, Blair and Brown have often asserted how tied 
to the mast of economic orthodoxy they are as a result of the ‘new global economy,’ 
construed as a non-negotiable external constraint restraining policy activism (Hay & 
Rosamond 2002: 151-7).  
 
This discursive construction of economic imperatives is an important part of New Labour, but 
critics have sometimes been too quick to take this discourse at face value. This is a mistake 
because it assumes a simplistic relationship between doctrine and policy. Ironically, New 
Labour’s policy record offers evidence that the degree of room for governmental manoeuvre 
is not as heavily circumscribed as the Blairite rhetoric of globalisation suggested. Its own 
activism gives the lie to its ‘headline’ discourse in globalisation. The analysis presented here 
highlights Labour’s fiscal activism, for example, which sits uncomfortably with Blair’s 
hyperglobal version of the implications of the global economy for social democratic 
governments. This suggests more complex responses to the process of globalisation in 
practice than New Labour chooses to articulate in its rhetorical deployment of globalisation. 
 
The ‘end of social democracy’ reading of the implications of globalisation, and the Blairite 
hyperglobalist discourse are both based on a crude and outdated interpretation of that multi-
faceted phenomenon. Within international political economy, there is increasing recognition 
that the complexity of economic globalisation generates ‘patterns of both economic 
convergence and divergence’ not captured by ‘neoclassical or linear models of economic 
globalisation which equate it solely with global economic convergence’ (McGrew 2005: 220). 
Anticipation that convergence will occur and is needed to ‘prove’ the existence of 
globalisation is flawed, rooted in a textbook neo-classical economic model, and the 
theoretically threadbare ‘logic of no alternative’ argument, both projected unhelpfully onto 
the global political economy. Rather, how the process of globalisation really ‘plays out’ is 
‘highly uneven such that it is associated with both economic convergence and divergence, as 
different economies/subregions/sectors are differentially integrated into this globalizing world 
economic order’ (McGrew 2005: 221). In fact, what we see is a diversity of responses to 
globalisation. The particularities of how international political economic change is 
                                                 
15 See D. Held , ‘Globalization: The Timid Tendency’ Marxism Today (Nov/Dec 1998) p. 24. 
16 See D. Held , ‘Globalization: The Timid Tendency’ Marxism Today (Nov/Dec 1998) pp24-27. 
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differentially mediated by ‘domestic’ institutions and politics, are all part of the ‘variable 
geometry’ (Castells 2000) of globalisation. 
 
In this light, it is easier to understand how the mooted incompatibility of economic strategies 
inspired by Keynesian thinking with the new international political economic context of 
global financial markets has been exaggerated. Certain Keynesian policies are sustainable in 
principle in a ‘globalizing’ world. The role of public investment reserved for fiscal policy 
within Keynesianism is not ‘ruled out’ by the new global economy. Rather, globalisation 
requires new institutions and pre-requisites in order to secure credibility with financial 
markets, thence to exploit the policy space available to pursue the politics of social 
democracy. The key point is that securing credibility through stability-centric macro policy 
stances is compatible with a wide range of different priorities in other areas of economic 
policy. Arguably, New Labour’s political economy has been developed to reconcile both the 
securing of credibility with international financial market actors and substantial fiscal policy 
space to pursue domestic economic policies of a broadly Keynesian character. Within a 
framework of a commitment to macro-economic stability, there remains room for manoeuvre 
over the degree of ‘orthodoxy’, as well as a whole range of other economic policy tools which 
may be exploited to prioritise ‘social democratic’ goals. A commitment to stability does not 
condemn a social democratic government to budgetary immobilisme, and even opens the door, 
despite the rejection of ‘fine tuning’, to a significant Keynesian influence on policy in pursuit 
of full employment. 
 
The international political economy literature has also evolved in its interpretation of the 
implications of globalisation for the welfare state. As Polanyi noted long ago, ‘interests, like 
intents, necessarily remain platonic unless they are translated into politics by the means of 
some social instrumentality’ (1945: 8). In the twentieth century, the establishment of the 
welfare state can be seen in these terms as the social instrumentality which resulted from the 
translation of the interests of the social democratic left into politics. At the turn of the twenty-
first century, many questioned whether welfare states remained financially viable propositions 
in the new global political economy. An initial hypothesis was that globalisation was bearing 
down on all welfare states with equal force, inducing retrenchment of programmes, and 
reductions in generosity (see Schwartz 2001 for a discussion and critique). Closer empirical 
inspection showed that pressures for welfare state retrenchment had been often overstated (see 
Swank 2002; Hobson 2005; Hay 2006). Subsequent studies suggested that such retrenchment 
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as is occurring within European welfare states is distributed differently across different 
welfare state clusters. This indicates differential vulnerability of extant EU welfare state 
‘clusters’ to liberalisation pressures within the global political economy. The Liberal model is, 
it seems, not alone in (fairly) successfully navigating the choppier waters of a more 
economically interdependent world. The (more generous, more egalitarian, and more social 
democratic) Scandinavian or Nordic model seems to be fairing well, too (Hay 2006:  9-13; 
Sapir 2006).   
 
New Labour and social democracy. 
 
Social democracy is, as Przeworski noted, is ‘contingent historical phenomenon’ (Przeworski 
1985: 3). When particular amalgams of policies and institutions change over the decades, this 
does not imply the necessary ‘end’ of social democracy, rather that the pursuit of social 
democratic ends require the development of new ‘means’. It is in this light that we should 
evaluate the record of New Labour and its relationship to social democracy. Of course, social 
democratic parties and governments may fail to live up to social democratic aspiration, and 
often pursue reformism which falls short of the social democratic aspirations of their 
supporters.  
 
At the level of ‘ends’ the degree of emphasis and self-confident assertion varies. On full 
employment, New Labour remains decidedly social democratic, with an enduring Keynesian 
influence on its macroeconomic stance. The credibility demanded by financial markets, which 
is partly a reflection of changed international political economic realities, has resulted in anti-
inflationary monetary policy, and policy institutions. These place certain parameters within 
which macroeconomic activism can be pursued, but New Labour  can point to a creditable 
(and arguably even Keynesian) policy record on full employment. 
 
On egalitarianism, the picture is at best mixed. Explicit affirmation of equality as a goal is 
rare with New Labour discourse. Critics point to a far from convincing redistributive record 
‘the pursuit of greater equality by active redistribution of income is rejected in principle ... 
redistribution implies a zero-sum trade-off between the interests of rich and poor which New 
Labour considers misguided’ (Glyn & Wood, 2001, 221). The overall picture of widening 
inequality within British society (see e.g. Hopkin & Wincott 2006) suggests that the 
redistributive policy record falls some way short of many social democrat’s aspirations for 
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three terms of Labour government. Despite what New Labour would have us believe, the 
record on redistribution is explicable in terms of policy choices (or non-choices), not the 
imperatives of the global economy. Other European economies have much better, in the sense 
of less inegalitarian policy records in the last decade. New Labour has made set of ideological 
assumptions about the kinds of labour market institutions, and levels of social minima, 
compatible with international competitiveness. These assumptions are not universally shared 
amongst social democrats.  
 
On the other hand, when we look at the most important policy choices in terms of 
macroeconomic policy, and social policy, it is not possible to accuse the Blair governments, 
especially since 2001, of not attempting a substantial redistribution of assets in Britain. New 
Labour’s aspiration in education and health reform recalls Stuart White’s ‘Asset Based 
Egalitarianism’, whereby more egalitarian market outcomes can only be secured if 
endowments of assets are more equal. The goal is equality of access to ‘life chances’ The 
government’s role is securing a ‘shift in the background distribution of these assets in a more 
egalitarian direction’ (White, 1998). The scale their investment in health and education are 
impressive by any standards. 
 
The commitment to education and training is seen as a manifestation of economic 
egalitarianism, which also boosts productivity and economic growth. However, this 
assumption of the marriage of economic efficiency and equality is problematic. As Giddens 
points out, broadening of ‘opportunity’ is not enough, and that ‘it is no good pretending that 
equality, pluralism and economic dynamism are always compatible’ (1998, 100). Questions 
can also be asked about the efficacy of their methods and mechanisms, from public private 
partnerships to the tendency for ‘hyper-innovation’ (Moran 2001) in the effort to reform the 
British state. This has more often resulted in perverse incentives, confused signals for policy 
implementation, and policy innovation fatigue, rather than substantial improvements in 
‘delivery’. 
 
New Labour enthusiasm for (and under-estimation of flaws within) market mechanisms in the 
pursuit of a more equitable delivery of public services is also questionable. Much of their 
thinking about the reform of the British state is borrowed from the ‘New Public Management’ 
paradigm, which in turn is rooted in a neo-liberal conception of the state. There are legitimate 
social democratic questions to be asked of the state/market relations at the heart of New 
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Labour’s welfare state reform agenda and their compatibility with social democratic goals. 
New Labour’s project, like other European social democrats overseeing a ‘modernisation’ of 
the state (as in Italy, and Spain for example) has failed to develop a social democratic critique 
of new public management. Social democracy has not redefined a coherent theory of the state 
to suit the new conditions of a more privatised, liberalised political economic order. Yet that 
is not to say that New Labour has simply accepted or adopted the neo-liberal theory of the 
state advocated by the New Classical School. This is not the case, for a ‘minimal’ neo-liberal  
state could not conceivably have spent the money on the public services over the last 7 years 
that New Labour has spent.  
 
The Future of Social Democracy  
 
New Labour has struggled, like social democratic governments both before them, and 
elsewhere in Europe, to develop effective means to deliver their ends. This does not mean that 
the ends of social democracy have been abandoned. Social democrats are casting about for the 
effective means to achieve those ends, and mistakes have been made. Somewhat depressingly, 
if we look at the history of social democracy government in Britain, that is neither novel, nor 
particularly surprising. For all the numerous achievements since 1997, New Labour can justly 
criticised for failing to deliver on egalitarian aspirations, and for not couching the reform 
agenda in a coherent social democratic theory of the British state. This should not be 
interpreted as evidence of ‘the failure’ of social democracy, still less the end of social 
democracy. Rather, it is a (very significant) failing within a particular social democratic 
project. The achievements of three successive New Labour governments attest to the potential 
viability of social democracy in the 21st Century, just as the failings demonstrate the 
difficulty, in this century as in the last, of reconciling social justice to capitalism whilst as the 
same time forging a stable governing coalition within the electorate  
 
In a more positive light, in the UK context, New Labour has redefined the British political 
settlement in a way which sures up the primacy of health and education paid by the public 
purse out of general taxation for the foreseeable future. The great moving right show on 
political economy and social policy issues of the 1970s and 1980s has to some extent been 
mirrored by a new realignment of British politics in the 2000s. The upshot is that David 
Cameron promises first and foremost to secure the future of the NHS, and feels constrained 
not to promise tax cuts.  
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 More broadly, across Europe, the ideological struggle between neo liberalism and social 
democracy is ongoing. The contours of the European political economy in the decades ahead 
is contested future, and social democracy as a political movement continues to play a key role. 
For example, Claire Annesley identifies the influence of the social democratic Swedish 
activation approach and the ‘adult worker model’ (AWM) in shaping the future of the 
European social model. This heralds an evolution away from the old ‘male breadwinner 
model’ (of which the post-war UK was a prime example) to an ‘emerging Europe-wide 
AWM’ seeking to integrate all economic inactive citizens – be they women, older citizens, the 
disabled – into the labour market (Annesley 2007: 196-8). She also discerns (halting) progress 
towards a Swedish-inspired ‘supported’ AWM with state provision of, for example, childcare 
and parental leave entitlements, i.e. the social democratic version of this model is, at the 
European level, ‘winning out’ over a neo-liberal version (2007: 199-202).  
 
The European ‘clash of capitalisms’ which emerged in the context of the EU Takeover 
Directive (Callaghan &  Hopner 2005) will be another ideological battlefield for social 
democracy and neoliberal political economy to meet toe-to-toe in the coming years. There is 
political space (within, for example, ongoing European corporate governance reform and 
harmonisation) for further social democratisation of European capitalism. In this centrury, as 
in the last, Social democracy will continue to develop its model of political economy – 
rethinking the means to deliver its enduring ends in the context of a changing role of the state 
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